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ince John Maynard Keynes wrote the General Theory of Employment,
Interest, and Money in 1936, Keynesian economics has been highly in-
ﬂuentialamongacademicsandpolicymakers. Keyneshascertainlyhad
hisdetractors,though,withthemostinﬂuentialbeingMiltonFriedman,Robert
Lucas, and Edward C. Prescott. Monetarist thought, the desire for stronger
theoretical foundations in macroeconomics, and real business cycle theory
have at times been at odds with Keynesian economics. However, Keynesian-
ism has remained a strong force, in part because its practitioners periodically
adapt by absorbing the views of its detractors into the latest “synthesis.”
John Hicks’s IS-LM interpretation of Keynes (Hicks 1937) and the popu-
larization of this approach, particularly in Samuelson’s textbook (Samuelson
1997), gave birth to the “neoclassical synthesis.” Later, the menu cost models
developed in the 1980s were a response to a drive for a more serious theory of
sticky prices (Mankiw 1985, Caplin and Spulber 1987). More recently, New
Keynesian economists have attempted to absorb real business cycle analy-
sis and other ideas from post-1972 macroeconomics into a “new neoclassical
synthesis” (Goodfriend and King 1997).
The important New Keynesian ideas, as summarized, for example in
Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003), are the following:
1. The key friction that gives rise to short-run nonneutralities of money
and the primary concern of monetary policy is sticky prices. Because
some prices are not fully ﬂexible, inﬂation or deﬂation induces relative
price distortions and welfare losses.
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2. Modern monetary economics is not part of the New Keynesian synthe-
sis. New Keynesians typically regard the frictions that we encounter
in deep (e.g., Lagos and Wright 2005) and not-so-deep (e.g., Lucas
and Stokey 1987) monetary economics as being second-order impor-
tance. These frictions are absence-of-double-coincidence problems
and information frictions that give rise to a fundamental role for mon-
etary exchange, and typically lead to intertemporal distortions that can
be corrected by monetary policy (for example, a ubiquitous result in
monetary economics is Friedman’s zero-nominal-interest-rate rule for
correcting intertemporal monetary distortions). The Friedman rule is
certainly not ubiquitous in New Keynesian economics.
3. The central bank is viewed as being able to set a short-term nominal
interestrate,andthemonetarypolicyproblemispresentedasthechoice
over alternative rules for how this nominal interest rate should be set
in response to endogenous and exogenous variables.
4. There is a short-run Phillips curve tradeoff. A monetary policy that




there are some important departures from the typical New Keynesian models
studied by Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler; Woodford; and others. However, these
departureswillhighlightwherethecentralideasandresultsinNewKeynesian
analysis are coming from.
For monetary economists, key aspects of New Keynesian economics can
bepuzzling. ForexampleinWoodford(2003),theapparentlypreferredframe-
work for analysis is a “cashless model” in which no outside money is held in
equilibrium. Prices are denominated in terms of some object called money,
and these prices are assumed to be sticky. The interest rate on a nominal bond
canbedeterminedinthecashlessmodel,andthecentralbankisassumedcapa-
ble of setting this nominal interest rate. Then, the monetary policy problem is
formulated as the choice over rules for setting this nominal interest rate. This
approachcanbecontrastedwiththecommonpracticeinmonetaryeconomics,
where we start with a framework in which money overcomes some friction,
serves as a medium of exchange, and is held in equilibrium in spite of being
dominated in rate of return by other assets. Then, studying the effects of mon-
etary policy amounts to examining the consequences of changing the stock
of outside money through various means: open market operations, central
bank lending, or outright “helicopter drops.” It is usually possible to consider
monetary policy rules that dictate the contingent behavior of a nominal in-
terest rate, but in most monetary models we can see what underlying actions
the central bank must take concerning monetary quantities to support such aS. D. Williamson: New Keynesian Economics 199
policy. What is going on here? Is the New Keynesian approach inconsistent
with the principles of monetary economics? Is it misleading?
The ﬁrst task in this article is to construct a cashless model with sticky
prices. This model departs from the usual New Keynesian construct in that
there are competitive markets rather than Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic
competition. This departure helps to make the model simple, and yields in-
formation on the importance of the noncompetitive behavior of ﬁrms for New
Keynesian economics. In general, given the emphasis on the sticky-price fric-
tioninNewKeynesianeconomics,wewouldhopethatitissomethinginherent
in the functioning of a sticky-price economy, rather than simply strategic be-
havior, that is at the heart of the New Keynesian mechanism.
Our cashless model is consistent with most of the predictions of standard
Keynesian models, new and old. The sticky-price friction leads to a relative
price distortion in that with inﬂation (deﬂation), too large (too small) a quan-
tity of sticky-price goods is produced and consumed relative to ﬂexible-price
goods. Optimally, the inﬂation rate is zero, which eliminates the relative price
distortion. One aspect in which this model differs from standard New Key-
nesian models is that it does not exhibit Phillips curve correlations. If the
substitution effect dominates in the labor supply response to a wage increase
(whichweconsiderthestandardcase),thenoutputisdecreasing(increasing)in
the inﬂation rate when the inﬂation rate is positive (negative). This is because
the distortion caused by sticky prices rises with the deviation from a constant
price level, and the representative consumer supplies less labor in response
to a larger sticky-price distortion. Thus, under these circumstances output
is maximized when the inﬂation rate is zero and there is no output/inﬂation
tradeoff. In the case where the income effect dominates in the labor supply
response to a change in wages, output increases (decreases) for positive (neg-
ative) inﬂation rates. Here there is a Phillips curve tradeoff if the inﬂation rate
is positive, but a zero inﬂation rate is optimal.
In most New Keynesian models, Phillips curve correlations are generated
because of the strategic forward-looking behavior of price-setting ﬁrms. A
ﬁrm, given the opportunity to set the price in units of money for its product,
knows it will not have this opportunity again until some time in the future.
Roughly, what matters to the ﬁrm is its expectation of the path for the price
level during the period of time until its next price-setting opportunity. If the
inﬂation rate is unusually high in the future, then the ﬁrm’s relative price will
be unexpectedly low, and then, by assumption, it will be satisfying higher-
than-expected demand for its product. Given that all ﬁrms behave in the same
way, unanticipated inﬂation will tend to be associated with high real output.
One message from our model is that Phillips curve behavior can disappear in
the absence of strategic behavior by ﬁrms, even with sticky prices.
We live in a world where outside money is held by consumers, ﬁrms, and
ﬁnancial institutions in the form of currency and reserve balances, and this200 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
outsidemoneyissuppliedbythecentralbankandusedinvarioustransactions
at the retail level and among ﬁnancial institutions. In using a cashless model
to analyze monetary policy, we should feel conﬁdent that we are not being led
astraybyaquestforsimplicity. Toevaluatewhatwemightloseinfocusingon
acashlessmodel, wedevelopamonetarymodelthatisastraightforwardcash-
in-advance extension of the cashless model. Then, in the spirit of Woodford
(2003), we explore how the behavior of this model compares to that of the
cashlessmodelandstudythe“cashlesslimit”ofthemoreelaboratemodel. As
it turns out, it requires very special assumptions for the limiting economy to
behave in the same way as the monetary economy, and, in any case, quantity
theory principles hold in equilibrium in the monetary economy. It is useful to
know how monetary quantities should be manipulated to produce particular
time paths of nominal interest rates, prices, and quantities in the economy, as
the key instruments that a central bank has available to it are the quantities
on its balance sheet. Thus, it would seem preferable to analyze monetary
economies rather than cashless economies.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 1 we construct the basic
cashlessmodel,workthroughexamples,anduncoverthegeneralpropertiesof
thismodel. Section2containsamonetarymodel,extendingthecashlessmodel
as a cash-in-advance construct with money and credit. Section 3 is a detailed
discussion of the importance of the results, and Section 4 is a conclusion.
1. CASHLESS MODEL
The goal of this section of the paper is to construct a simple sticky-price
model that will capture the key aspects of New Keynesian economics, while
also taking a somewhat different approach to price determination, in order
to simplify and illuminate the important principles at work. The model we
construct shares features with typical New Keynesian “cashless” models (see
Woodford 2003), which are the following:
1. Money is not useful for overcoming frictions, it does not enter a cash-
in-advance constraint or a utility function, nor does it economize on
transactions costs.
2. Money is a numeraire in which all prices are denominated.
3. The money prices of goods are sticky in that, during any period, some
goodspricesarepredeterminedanddonotrespondtocurrentaggregate
shocks.
This model captures the essential friction that New Keynesians argue
should be the focus of monetary policy—a sticky-price friction. New
Keynesians argue that the other frictions that we typically encounter in mon-
etary models—absence-of-double-coincidence problems and intertemporalS. D. Williamson: New Keynesian Economics 201
price distortions, for example—are of second order for the problem at hand.
Further, New Keynesians feel that it is important to model the monetary pol-
icy problem in terms of the choice of nominal interest rate rules and that this
framework is a very convenient vehicle in that respect.
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t denotes consumption of the ith good, i = 1,2, and nt is labor
supply. Assume that u(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice con-
tinuously differentiable, and has the property u (0) =∞ . As well, v(·) is
strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice differentiable with v (0) = 0
and v (h) =∞for some h>0. We have assumed a separable period utility
function for convenience, and a two-good model is sufﬁcient to exposit the
ideas of interest. Goods are perishable. There are linear technologies for
producing goods from labor input, i.e.,
yi
t = γ tni
t, (2)
whereyi
t isoutputofgoodi,γ t isaggregateproductivity,andni
t isthequantity
of labor input applied to production of good i. Assume that γ t follows an
exogenous stochastic process.
This model is very simple. There is no investment or capital, and an
optimal allocation is a sequence {˜ n1
t, ˜ n2
t , ˜ c1
t , ˜ c2
t }∞





t =˜ ct, with ˜ ct = γ t ˜ nt, where ˜ nt solves
v (2˜ nt)
u (γ t ˜ nt)
= γ t. (3)
Therefore, attheoptimum, consumptionofthetwogoodsshouldbeequal
in each period with the same quantity of labor allocated to production of each
good, given symmetry. As well, from (3) the ratio of the marginal disutility
of labor to the marginal utility of consumption should be equal to aggregate
productivity for each good in each period.
There is another object, which we will call money, that plays only the role
of numeraire. We will assume a form of price stickiness reminiscent of what
obtains in the staggered wage-setting models of Fischer (1977) and Taylor
(1979). That is, assume that prices are sticky, in the sense that, if the price of
a good is ﬂexible in period t,then it remains ﬁxed at its period t value through
period t + 1, and is subsequently ﬂexible in period t + 2, etc. In any given
period, one good is ﬂexible and the other is sticky. Now, since in (1) and (2)
the two goods are treated symmetrically in preferences and technology, we
can let good 1 be the ﬂexible-price good in each period. Then, let Pt denote
thepriceinunitsofmoneyoftheﬂexible-pricegoodinperiodt, andthenPt−1202 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
is the price of the sticky-price good. As well, let Wt denote the nominal wage
rate.
The Keynesian modeler must always deal with the problem of how ﬁrms
and consumers behave in the face of price and/or wage stickiness, as well as
how quantities are determined. In typical textbook sticky-wage approaches,
thenominalwageisexogenous, andthequantityoflabortradedisdetermined
by what is optimal for the representative ﬁrm. Standard textbook sticky-price
modelshaveasinglegoodsoldatanexogenousnominalprice,andthequantity
of output is demand-determined.1
In New Keynesian economics, the emphasis is on price stickiness (as op-
posed to wage stickiness), the distribution of prices across goods, and relative
price distortions. Clearly, if there is a homogeneous good, constant returns
to scale, competitive equilibrium, and perfect information, we cannot have
anything other than a degenerate distribution of prices in equilibrium, where
allﬁrmsproducingpositiveoutputchargethesameprice. TheNewKeynesian
approach at least requires heterogeneous goods, and the standard model in the
literature is currently one with monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. For ex-
ample, a typical approach is to assume monopolistic competition with Calvo
(1983)pricesetting(or“time-dependentpricing”). Insuchamodel, eachﬁrm
randomly obtains the opportunity to change its nominal price each period,
so that with a continuum of ﬁrms, some constant fraction of ﬁrms changes
their prices optimally, while the remaining fraction is constrained to setting
prices at the previous period’s values. Alternatively, it could be assumed that
each of the monopolistically competitive ﬁrms must set their prices one pe-
riodinadvance,beforeobservingaggregate(orpossiblyidiosyncratic)shocks.
Woodford (2003), for example, takes both approaches.
Neither Calvo pricing nor price setting one period in advance in monopo-
listiccompetitionmodelsiswithoutproblems. InaCalvopricingmodel, each
monopolistically competitive ﬁrm is constrained to producing one product.
There may be states of the world where some ﬁrms will earn negative proﬁts,
buttheyaresomehowrequiredtoproducestrictlypositiveoutputanyway, and
ﬁrms cannot reallocate productive factors to the production of ﬂexible-price
goods that will yield higher proﬁts. With prices set one period in advance,
ﬁrms are constrained to produce, even in the face of negative ex post proﬁts.
Here,wehaveassumeddifferentiatedproducts,butwewillmaintaincom-
petitive pricing. This model is certainly not typical, so it requires some ex-
planation. First, the consumer’s budget constraint will imply that all wage
income will be spent on the two consumption goods, so
Ptγ tn1
t + Pt−1γ tn2
t − Wt(n1
t + n2
t ) = 0. (4)
1 See Williamson (2008) for examples of standard Keynesian sticky-wage and sticky-price
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However,thiswouldthenseemtoimplythat,unlessPt = Pt−1,theproduction
and sale of one good will earn strictly positive proﬁts and production and sale
of the other good will yield strictly negative proﬁts. Thus, it seems that it
cannot be proﬁt-maximizing for both goods to be produced in equilibrium.
However, suppose that we take for granted, as is typical in much of the New
Keynesian literature, that there will be some ﬁrms that are constrained to
producing the sticky-price good, and that the ﬁrms who produce this good
will satisfy whatever demand arises at the price Pt−1. How then should we
determine which ﬁrms produce which good? For this purpose, assume that
there is a lottery, which works as follows. Before a ﬁrm produces, it enters a
lotterywheretheoutcomeofthelotterydetermineswhethertheﬁrmproduces
theﬂexible-pricegoodorthesticky-pricegood. Ifitisdeterminedthroughthe
lottery that a particular ﬁrm produces the ﬂexible-price good, then that ﬁrm
receivesasubsidyofs1
t innominalterms,perunitofoutput. Ifitisdetermined
that a particular ﬁrm produces the ﬁxed-price good, that ﬁrm receives s2
t per
unit of output. The agent that offers the lottery will set s1
t and s2
t so that any
ﬁrm is indifferent between producing the ﬁxed-price and ﬂexible-price goods,
i.e.,
Pt − s1
t = Pt−1 − s2
t . (5)
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Given these subsidy rates, the agent offering the lottery breaks even and each
ﬁrm is willing to enter the lottery as proﬁts per unit produced are zero in
equilibrium, whether the ﬁrm ultimately produces the ﬂexible-price or sticky-
price good. Though this cross-subsidization setup may seem unrealistic, it
does not seem less palatable than what occurs in typical Keynesian sticky-
price models. In fact, the randomness in determining which ﬁrms produce
which good is reminiscent of the randomness in Calvo (1983) pricing, but our
approach is much more tractable.
Now, let πt denote the relative price of ﬂexible-price and sticky-price
goods, which is also the gross rate of increase in the price of the ﬂexible-
price good. Under some special circumstances, πt will also be the measured
inﬂation rate, but in general that is not the case. However, πt is the relative
price that captures the extent of the effects of the sticky-price friction. Letting204 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly









t ) = 0. (7)
Optimization by the consumer is summarized by the following two marginal
conditions:
u (c1
t ) − πtu (c2
t ) = 0 and (8)
wtu (c1
t ) − v (n1
t + n2
t ) = 0. (9)
In equilibrium all output must be consumed, so
ci
t = γ tni
t (10)
for i = 1,2. Further, letting qt denote the price at time t of a claim to one unit
















qt ≤ 1, so that the nominal interest rate is nonnegative in each state of the
world. There is clearly indeterminacy here, as there appears to be nothing
that will pin down prices. In equilibrium there is an object called money
that is in zero supply, and which, for some unspeciﬁed reason, serves as a
unit of account in which prices are denominated. The path that πt follows in
equilibrium clearly matters, because prices are sticky, but the possibilities for
equilibrium paths for πt are limitless.
Examples
One equilibrium is πt = 1 for all t, which from (7)–(11) gives the optimal
allocation with ˜ n1
t =˜ n2
t =˜ nt and ˜ c1
t =˜ c2
t =˜ ct, where ˜ ct = γ t ˜ nt, and where
˜ nt solves (3). Solving for qt from equation (11), we get
qt = βEt
 
u (γ t+1˜ nt+1)
u (γ t ˜ nt)
 
, (12)
and so long as the variability in productivity is not too large, we will have
qt ≤ 1 for all t, so that the nominal interest rate is always nonnegative, and
this is indeed an equilibrium.
Alternatively (for example, see Woodford 2003), we could argue that the
central bank can set the nominal interest rate it = 1
qt − 1. In this instance, if





u (γ t+1˜ nt+1)
u (γ t ˜ nt)
  −1
− 1, (13)S. D. Williamson: New Keynesian Economics 205
an equilibrium with πt = 1 for all t can be achieved, which is optimal.
Thereisnothinginthemodelthattellsuswhythecentralbankcancontrol
it, and why it cannot control πt, for example. In New Keynesian models, the
justiﬁcationfortreatingthemarketnominalinterestrateasadirectinstrument
of the central bank comes from outside the model, along the lines of “this is
whatmostcentralbanksdo.”Inanycase, anoptimalpolicyimpliesthat, since
πt = 1, the price level is constant and the inﬂation rate is zero. This optimal
policy could then be characterized as an inﬂation rate peg, or as a policy that
requires, from (13), that the nominal interest rate target for the central bank
ﬂuctuate with the aggregate technology shock. More simply, from (13), the
nominal interest rate at the optimum should equal the “Wicksellian natural
rate of interest” (see Woodford 2003).
There are, of course, many suboptimal equilibria in this model. For ex-
ample, consider the special case where u(c) = lnc and v(n) = δn,for δ>0.
Though v(·) does not satisfy some of our initial restrictions, this example
proves particularly convenient. We will ﬁrst construct an equilibrium with a
constant inﬂation rate, which has the property that πt = α,where α is a posi-
tive constant (recall that πt is not the gross inﬂation rate, but if πt is constant



































In this equilibrium, the rate of inﬂation is α − 1. Note, from (14)–(19),
that higher inﬂation causes a reallocation of consumption and labor supply
from ﬂexible-price to sticky-price goods. From equation (15) for qt ≤ 1,
it is sufﬁcient that α not be too small and that γ t not be too variable. This
equilibrium is of particular interest because it involves an inﬂation rate peg.
Of course, as we showed previously, α = 1 is optimal.206 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Alternatively, consider the same example as above, with log utility from
consumption and linear disutility to supplying labor, but now suppose that πt













γ t(γ t + γ t+1)






















δ(γt−1 + γ t)
. (25)
From (21) it is sufﬁcient for the existence of equilibrium that γ t not be too
variable. Noteinthesolution,(20)–(25),thatequilibriumquantitiesandprices
all exhibit persistence because of the contingent path that prices follow. Com-
plicated dynamics can be induced through the nominal interest rate rule, of
which (25) is an example in this case. Indeed, it is possible (see Woodford
2003), given some nominal interest rate rules, to obtain equilibrium solutions
where current endogenous variables depend on anticipated future aggregate
shocks. TypicalNewKeynesianmodelsalsoobtainequilibriumsolutionswith
suchpropertiesthroughtheforward-lookingprice-settingbehaviorofmonop-
olistically competitive producers. This latter mechanism is not present in our
model.
General Properties of the Model
To further analyze our model, we ﬁnd it useful to consider how we would
solve for an equilibrium in this model in the absence of sticky prices. The
model is purely static, so we can solve period-by-period. An equilibrium for
period t consists of relative prices πt and wt, and quantities n1
t,n 2
t ,c 1
t , andS. D. Williamson: New Keynesian Economics 207
c2
t that solve the marginal conditions (8) and (9), the equilibrium conditions
(10), and two zero-proﬁt conditions:
γ tn1
t − wtn1





t = 0. (27)
Of course, the solution we get is the optimum, with wt = γ t,π t = 1,
n1
t = n2
t =˜ nt, and c1
t = c2




sense, as a model where one price, πt, is ﬁxed exogenously. Given any
exogenous πt  = 1, it cannot be the case that all agents optimize and all
markets clear in equilibrium. The solution we have chosen here, which is in
line with standard New Keynesian economics, is to allow for the fact that (26)
and (27) do not both hold. Instead, we allow for cross-subsidization with zero
net subsidies across production units and zero proﬁts in equilibrium net of
subsidies for production of each good, which gives us equation (7).
Given this interpretation of the model, how should we interpret qt, as
determined by equation (11)? Since πt is simply the relative price of good 2
intermsofgood1inperiodt,qt istheprice, inunitsofgood1inperiodt,that
a consumer would pay for delivery of one unit of good 2 in period t +1.Why,









hold? Such a condition requires the existence of a monetary object. Then
we can interpret (11) as determining the price in units of money in period
t of a claim to one unit of money delivered in period t + 1, and inequality
(28) is required so that zero money balances are held in equilibrium. Thus, in
equilibrium the model is purely atemporal. There is no intertemporal trade,
nevertheless there exist equilibrium prices for money in terms of goods and
for the nominal bond in each period.
Thus far, this may be somewhat puzzling for most monetary economists,
who are accustomed to thinking about situations in which money is not held
in equilibrium as ones in which the value of money in units of goods is zero
in each period. This does not happen here, but no fundamental principles of
economic analysis appear to have been violated.
The key question, then, is what we can learn from this model. First, we
will get some idea of the operating characteristics of the model through linear
approximation. If we treat πt as exogenous, following our interpretation
above, then the exogenous variables are γ t and πt. Substitute using equation
(10) in (7)–(9), and then linearize around the solution we get with γ t =¯ γ and208 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
πt = 1, where ¯ γ is a positive constant. The equilibrium solution we get in
this benchmark case is wt =¯ γ,n 1
t = n2
t =¯ n, and c1
t = c2
t =¯ γ ¯ n, where ¯ n
solves
¯ γu  (¯ γ ¯ n) − v (2¯ n) = 0.
The solution to the linearized model is (leaving out the solution for the wage,
wt) :
n1
t =¯ n +
u (−2v   +¯ γ 2u  )
2¯ γu   (¯ γ 2u   − 2v  )
(πt − 1) −
u  +¯ γ ¯ nu  
¯ γ 2u   − 2v  (γ t −¯ γ), (29)
n2
t =¯ n +
u (2v   −¯ γ 2u  )
2¯ γu   (¯ γ 2u   − 2v  )
(πt − 1) −
u  +¯ γ ¯ nu  
¯ γ 2u   − 2v  (γ t −¯ γ), (30)
c1
t =¯ γ ¯ n +
u (−2v   +¯ γ 2u  )
2u  (¯ γ 2u   − 2v  )
(πt − 1) −
2¯ nv   +¯ γu  
¯ γ 2u   − 2v  (γ t −¯ γ), and (31)
c2
t =¯ γ ¯ n +
u (2v   −¯ γ 2u  )
2u  (¯ γ 2u   − 2v  )
(πt − 1) −
2¯ nv   +¯ γu  
¯ γ 2u   − 2v  (γ t −¯ γ), (32)
and aggregate labor supply and output are given, respectively, by
n1
t + n2
t = 2¯ n −
2(u  +¯ γ ¯ nu  )
¯ γ 2u   − 2v   (γ t −¯ γ)and (33)
c1
t + c2
t = 2¯ γ ¯ n −
2(2¯ nv   +¯ γu  )
¯ γ 2u   − 2v   (γ t −¯ γ). (34)
Therefore, from (29)–(34), in the neighborhood of an equilibrium with con-
stantprices,anincreaseinπt,whichcorrespondstoanincreaseintheinﬂation
rate, results in a decrease in the production and consumption of the ﬂexible-
pricegood,anincreaseinproductionandconsumptionoftheﬁxed-pricegood,
and no effect on aggregate labor supply and output. Thus, this model does
not produce a Phillips curve correlation, at least locally, and increases in the
inﬂation rate serve only to misallocate production and consumption across
goods.
As well, from (29)–(34), a positive shock to aggregate productivity has
the same effect on production and consumption of both goods. If
u  +¯ γ ¯ nu   > 0, (35)
then the substitution effect of the productivity increase offsets the income
effect on labor supply so that aggregate labor supply increases. In what fol-
lows, we assume that the substitution effect dominates, i.e., (35) holds. From
(34), aggregate output increases with an increase in productivity, regardless
of whether the substitution effect dominates.S. D. Williamson: New Keynesian Economics 209
The absence of a Phillips curve effect here might seem puzzling, as a pos-
itive relationship between inﬂation and output often appears as a cornerstone
of new and old Keynesian economics. Thus, we should explore this further to
see how πt affects output outside of the neighborhood of our baseline equilib-
rium. Consider an example that will yield closed-form solutions, in particular
u(c) = c1−α−1















































































































































Now, in the solution (36)–(42), the condition (35) is equivalent to α<1.
Given this, labor supply in both sectors is increasing in productivity, as, of
course, is consumption of each good and total output.
Our primary interest in this example is what it tells us about the rela-
tionship between πt and aggregate output. Note from equation (42) that this
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Differentiating, we obtain





















Therefore, for the case α<1, we have G (1) = 0,G  (π) > 0 for π<1, and
G (π) < 0 for π>1. Thus, output is maximized for π = 1 and the Phillips
curve has a negative slope when inﬂation is positive and a positive slope when
inﬂation is negative. The key to the Phillips curve relationship is how labor
supply responds to the distortion created by inﬂation or deﬂation due to the
the sticky-price friction. When the substitution effect on labor supply of an
increase in productivity dominates the income effect, an increase or decrease
in the inﬂation rate from zero implies that the marginal payoff from supplying
labor falls, and the consumer therefore reduces labor supply.
Theinterestingaspectoftheseresultsisthattheypointtoanonrobustlink
between price stickiness and Phillips curve correlations. In spite of the fact
thatﬁrmsdonotsetpricesstrategicallyinaforward-lookingmanner, intuition
might tell us that there should still be a Phillips curve correlation. That is,
with higher inﬂation, it might seem that the additional quantity of output
produced by sticky-price ﬁrms should be greater than the reduction in output
by ﬂexible-price ﬁrms, and aggregate output should increase. However, our
analysis shows that this need not be the case and that the key to understanding
the mechanism at work is labor supply behavior.
In our model, since not all prices are sticky, the key effect of inﬂation
on output comes from the relative price distortion, and labor supply may
increase or decrease in response to higher inﬂation, with a decrease occurring
when the elasticity of substitution of labor supply is sufﬁciently high. As we
commented earlier, the assumptions on price stickiness and ﬁrm behavior in
our model seem no less palatable than what is typically assumed. Thus, the
nonrobustness of the Phillips curve we ﬁnd here deserves attention.
2. A MONETARY MODELAND THE “CASHLESS LIMIT”
InNewKeynesianeconomics(e.g.,Woodford2003),baseline“cashless”mod-
els are taken seriously as frameworks for monetary policy analysis. As we
have seen, the cashless model focuses attention on the sticky-price friction
as the key source of short-run nonneutralities of money. New Keynesian ar-
guments for using a cashless model appear to be as follows: (i) the standard
intertemporalmonetarydistortions—forexample,laborsupplydistortionsand
the tendency for real cash balances to be suboptimally low when the nomi-
nal interest rate is greater than zero—are quantitatively unimportant; (ii) in
models where there is some motive for holding money, if we take the limit
as the motive for holding money goes to zero, then this limiting economy has
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of this section is to evaluate these arguments in the context of a particular
monetary model.
For our purposes, a convenient expository vehicle is a cash-in-advance
model of money and credit where we can parameterize the friction that makes
money useful in transactions. There are other types of approaches we could
take here; for example, we could use a monetary search and matching frame-
work along the lines of Lagos and Wright (2005),2 but the model we use here
allowsustoappendmonetaryexchangetothecashlessmodelinSection2with
the least fuss. Our framework is much like that inAlvarez, Lucas, and Weber
(2001), absent limited participation frictions, but including the labor supply
decision and the sticky-price friction we have been maintaining throughout.
The structure of preferences, technology, and price determination is identical
to that which we assumed in the cashless model.
Here, suppose that the representative consumer trades on asset markets at
the beginning of each period and then takes the remaining money to the goods
market, where goods can be purchased with money and credit. The consumer
faces the cash-in-advance constraint
Ptc1
t + Pt−1c2
t + qtbt+1 ≤ θWt(n1
t + n2
t ) + mt + τt + stlt + bt, (43)
where bt denotes one-period nominal bonds purchased by the consumer in
period t −1, each of which pays off one unit of money in period t; mt denotes
nominalmoneybalancescarriedoverfromthepreviousperiod;τt isanominal
lump-sumtransferfromthegovernment;andstlt isawithin-periodmoneyloan
from the central bank, where lt is the nominal amount that must be returned
to the central bank at the end of the period. Also, θ denotes the fraction of
current-period wage income that can be accessed in the form of within-period
credit when the consumer trades in the goods market. Note that 1
st − 1i st h e
within-periodnominalinterestrateoncentralbankloans,and,asabove, 1
qt −1
is the one-period nominal interest rate. Here 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, and θ is the critical
parameter that captures the usefulness of money in transactions. With θ = 0,
this is a pure monetary economy, and with θ = 1, money is irrelevant.
The consumer must also satisfy his or her budget constraint, given by
Ptc1
t +Pt−1c2
t +mt+1+qtbt+1 = Wt(n1
t +n2
t )+mt+τt+(st − 1)lt+bt. (44)
Let Mt denote the supply of money and Lt denote the supply of central
bank loans. Then the asset market equilibrium conditions are
mt = Mt; bt = 0; lt = Lt, (45)
or, money demand equals money supply, the demand for bonds equals the
supply, and the demand for central bank loans equals the supply.
2 See, for example, Aruoba and Schorfheide (2008), where a monetary search model with
nominal rigidities is constructed for use in quantitative work.212 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Eliminating Intertemporal Distortions with Central
Bank Lending
In general, an equilibrium in this model is difﬁcult to characterize, as price
stickiness complicates the dynamics. In part, our goal will be to determine
the features of a “cashless limit” in this economy, along the lines ofWoodford
(2003). To that end, given the New Keynesian view that intertemporal distor-
tionsareunimportant,supposethattheregimeofcentralbanklendingissetup
so that those distortions are eliminated. That is, suppose that the central bank
supplies no money, except through central bank loans made at the beginning
of the period at a zero nominal interest rate.
Let st = 1, and suppose that the central bank accommodates whatever
demand for central bank loans arises at a zero nominal interest rate. We then
haveMt = τt = 0forallt andLt = (1−θ)Wt(n1
t +n2
t ).Then,given(43)–(45),
optimization, and goods market equilibrium, we can deﬁne an equilibrium in
terms of relative prices and quantities, just as in the cashless economy.
This monetary regime is then one where all economic agents have access
to a daylight overdraft facility, much like the Federal Reserve System uses
each day to accommodate payments among ﬁnancial institutions. Given a
zero nominal interest rate on daylight overdrafts, money will not be held
between periods, which we can interpret as a system in which holdings of
outside money are zero overnight (interpreting a period as a day). This setup
is extreme, as it allows universal access to central bank lending facilities and
does not admit anything resembling currency-holding in equilibrium.
Inequilibrium, (7)–(11)mustbesatisﬁed, justasinthecashlesseconomy.
The key difference in this monetary economy will be in the determination of
πt. Supposing for convenience that (43) always holds with equality in each














t ,w t,πt,q t}∞
t=0, with π0 given, solving (7)–(11) and (46). The
solution must satisfy qt ≤ 1 for all t, which assures that an equilibrium
exists where (43) holds with equality. In general, it is not straightforward to
characterize a solution, but it is clear from (46) that the solution is consistent
withthequantitytheoryofmoney. Thatis,Lt isthenominalquantityofmoney
available to spend in period t,and wt(n1
t + n2




πt is total GDP.
Therefore, (46) states that the rate of increase in the price of the ﬂexible-price
good is roughly equal to the rate of money growth minus the rate of growth
in real GDP. Note that the parameter θ does not appear anywhere in (7)–(11)
and (46). That is, we can treat the equilibrium solution as the cashless limit,
as we will obtain the same solution for any θ>0. Note here that the cashless
limit of this monetary economy is not the cashless economy, and the quantityS. D. Williamson: New Keynesian Economics 213
of money is important for the solution, along quantity theory lines, in spite of
the fact that no money is held between periods. Thus, we have followed the
logic of Woodford (2003) here, but we do not get Woodford’s results.
What is an optimal monetary policy here, given that the within-period
nominal interest rate is zero? The key choice for the central bank is Lt, the
nominal loan quantity in each period. If Lt can be set so that πt = 1 for all
t, then clearly this would be an optimal policy, since from (7)–(11) we will
obtain ni




γ t ˜ nt
γ t−1˜ nt−1
. (47)
This optimal policy then implies a nominal bond price
qt = βEt
 
u (γ t+1˜ nt+1)
u (γ t ˜ nt)
 
, (48)
and for this optimal policy to support an equilibrium, we require that qt ≤ 1
for all t,which is satisﬁed provided the variability in γ t is sufﬁciently small.
Thus,wecandeﬁnetheoptimalmonetarypolicyasaruleformonetarygrowth,
which accommodates GDP growth according to (47) or as a nominal interest
rate rule governed by (48), i.e., the money growth rule and nominal interest
rate rule are ﬂip sides of the same monetary policy. On the one hand, the
money growth rule in (47) states that the money supply should always grow at
thesamerateasoptimalGDP.Ontheotherhand, thenominalinterestraterule
states that the nominal interest rate should move in response to productivity
shocks in such a way that it is equal to the optimal real interest rate.
Part of the New Keynesian justiﬁcation for use of a cashless model (see
Woodford 2003) is that if intertemporal frictions are insigniﬁcant, even if
there is a monetary friction in the model, then the prescription for the optimal
nominal interest rate rule is the same as in the cashless economy. This is
certainly true here, as the nominal interest rate rule implicit in (48) is the same
as (12). For our purposes, though, the monetary economy is more informative
about policy, as it says something about the monetary policy regime that is
necessary to get this result, and gives us a prescription for how the central
bank should manipulate the quantities that it has under its control.
3. DISCUSSION
In this section we will discuss our results, organized in terms of monetary
policy instruments, Phillips curves, and monetary frictions.
Monetary Policy Instruments
What can a central bank control? Ultimately, if we ignore the central bank’s
regulatory powers, a central bank can control two sets of things. First, it214 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly




made using outside money and the interest rates on overnight central bank
lending or lending at longer maturities. The key power a central bank holds
is its monopoly on the issue of ﬁat money. Essentially, a central bank is much
like any other bank in that its liabilities serve as a means of payment, and it
performs a type of liquidity transformation in intermediating assets that are
difﬁcult to use as means of payment. Central bankers, and many economists,
hold the view that the quantity of intermediation that the central bank carries
out, reﬂected in the quantity of ﬁat money outstanding, has consequences for
real economic activity in the short run and for prices.
Central banks cannot set market interest rates, though they might like to.
New Keynesians typically model central bank behavior as the determination
of a market nominal interest rate as a function of endogenous and exogenous
variables. There are good reasons to think that a central bank operating pro-
cedure consisting of periodic revision of an overnight nominal interest rate
target or inﬂation rate targeting is preferable to the money growth targeting
that Friedman (1968) had in mind. That is, the predominant shocks that are of
concern to the central bank in the very short run, say between Federal Open
Market Committee meetings, are ﬁnancial market shocks that cause ﬂuctua-
tions in the demand for outside money. Given that these shocks are difﬁcult to
observe,asensibleproceduremaybetosmooththeovernightnominalinterest
rate, which may serve to optimally accommodate ﬁnancial market shocks.
Though it may be possible in the short run for a central bank to use the
instruments at its disposal to keep a market nominal interest rate within a
tight prespeciﬁed corridor, it is inappropriate to use this as a justiﬁcation for
a mode of analysis that eliminates monetary considerations. A model that is
used to analyze and evaluate monetary policy should tell us how the economy
functions under one central bank operating procedure (e.g., monetary target-
ing) versus another (e.g., nominal interest rate targeting), how the instruments
availabletothecentralbank(i.e., monetaryquantities)needtobemanipulated
to implement a particular policy rule, and how using alternative instruments
(e.g., centralbanklendingversusopenmarketoperations)makesadifference.
Phillips Curves
Some type of Phillips curve relationship, i.e., a positive relationship between
the“outputgap,” ontheonehand,andtherateofinﬂationortheunanticipated
componentofinﬂation,ontheotherhand,istypicallyfoundinNewKeynesian
macroeconomic models. The Phillips curve was an important example in
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correlation as structural (Lucas 1972). In New Keynesian economics, the
Phillips curve has made a comeback as a structural relationship and plays a
central role in reduced-form New Keynesian models (e.g., Clarida, Gal´ ı, and
Gertler 1999).
As we have shown here, in a sticky-price model that seems as reasonable
as typical monopolistically competitive New Keynesian setups, there is no
tradeoff between output and inﬂation in the standard case where substitution
effects dominate in the response of labor supply to a wage increase. With a
zeroinﬂationrate,outputismaximized. Eveninthecasewhereincomeeffects
are large, more output can be obtained if the inﬂation rate deviates from zero,
but this is inefﬁcient. Further, in this case, more output can be obtained not
only with inﬂation, but with deﬂation.
Monetary Frictions
Weknowthatwhatmakesamoderncentralbankuniqueisthepowergrantedto
it as the monopoly issuer of outside money, which takes the form of deposits
with the central bank and circulating currency. We also know that central
banking is not a necessity. Indeed, there are examples of economies that grew
and thrived without a central bank. The United States did not have a central
bank until 1914, and the private currency systems in place in Scotland from
1716–1845 and in Canada before 1935 are generally regarded as successes.
Before asking how a central bank should behave, we might want to ask what
justiﬁes its existence in the ﬁrst place.
From the viewpoint of a monetary economist, a theory of central banking
shouldnotonlytelluswhattheroleofthecentralbankisinamoderneconomy,
but also why we should grant the central bank a monopoly in supplying key
media of exchange. Such a central banking theory must necessarily come
to grips with the principal frictions that make money useful as a medium of
exchange and the frictions that may make private provision of some types of
media of exchange inefﬁcient.
New Keynesians argue that we can do a better job of understanding how
monetary policy works and how it should be conducted by ignoring these
frictions. By using a very simple cash-in-advance construct, we have shown
these arguments require some very special assumptions. For our cashless
sticky-price economy to work in the same way as does a comparable mone-
tary economy requires that: (i) a monetary regime be in place that corrects
intertemporalinefﬁciencies;(ii)alleconomicagentsbeonthereceivingendof
the central bank’s actions; and (iii) currency holding be unimportant. While
some countries, such as Canada and New Zealand, have moved to mone-
tary systems without reserve requirements and with interest on reserves, thus
correcting some distortions, most countries are far from the elimination of in-
tertemporal monetary frictions. Thus, in practice it is likely that intertemporal216 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
distortions play an important role, and arguably the important role if we are
considering the effects of long-run anticipated inﬂation. Also, the fact that
not all economic agents are on the receiving end of monetary policy actions,
which gives rise to distributional effects of monetary policy, is regarded as
important in the segmented markets literature. Market segmentation (in both
goods and ﬁnancial markets) is perhaps of greater signiﬁcance than sticky-
price frictions in generating short-run nonneutralities of money (see Alvarez
and Atkeson 1997; Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe 2003; Williamson [Forth-
comingA, ForthcomingB]). Finally, currency is still widely used in the world
economy(AlvarezandLippi2007). Inspiteoftechnologicalimprovementsin
transactions technologies, currency is a wonderfully simple transactions tech-
nology that permits exchange in the many circumstances where anonymous
individuals need to transact with each other.
4. CONCLUSION
Recent events involving turmoil in credit markets and heretofore unheard-of
interventions by the Federal Reserve System make it abundantly clear that the
monetarypolicyproblemisfarfromsolved. Further,forthekeyquestionsthat
need to be answered in the midst of this crisis, New Keynesian economics ap-
pearstobeunhelpful. Howiscentralbanklendingdifferentfromopenmarket
operations in terms of the effects on ﬁnancial markets and goods markets? To
whichinstitutionsshouldacentralbankbelendingandunderwhatconditions?
What regulatory power should the Federal Reserve System exercise over the
institutions to which it lends? Should the Fed’s direct intervention be limited
to conventional banks, or should this intervention be extended to investment
banks and government-sponsored ﬁnancial institutions? Unfortunately, typ-
ical New Keynesian models ignore credit markets, monetary frictions, and
banking and are, therefore, of little or no use in addressing these pressing
questions.
What hope do we have of developing a theory of money and central bank-
ingthatcansatisfymonetaryeconomistsandalsobeofpracticalusetocentral
bankers? Monetary economics and banking theory have come a long way in
the last 30 years or more, and perhaps the economics profession needs to be
educated as to why modern monetary and banking theory is useful and can be
applied to policy problems. We now understand that recordkeeping and the
ﬂow of information over space and time is critical to the role of currency as
a medium of exchange (Kocherlakota 1998). We know that decentralized
exchange with currency can lead to holdup problems that accentuate the
welfare losses from inﬂation (Lagos and Wright 2005). We understand how
banks act to insure private agents against liquidity risk (Diamond and
Dybvig 1983) and to economize on monitoring costs (Diamond 1984,
Williamson 1986). We know that ﬁnancial market segmentation and goodsS. D. Williamson: New Keynesian Economics 217
market segmentation are importantfor monetary policy (Alvarez and
Atkeson 1997; Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe 2003; Williamson
[ForthcomingA; Forthcoming B]). Putting together elements of these ideas in
a comprehensive theory of central banking is certainly within our grasp, and
I very much look forward to future developments.
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